The most formidable challenge in assembling a smart grid is the integration of a high penetration of renewables. Demand response (DR), a largely promising concept, is increasingly discussed as a means to cope with the intermittent and uncertain renewables. In this paper, we propose a dynamic market mechanism (DMM) that reaches the market equilibrium through continuous negotiations between key market players. In addition to incorporating renewables, this market mechanism also incorporates a quantitative taxonomy of DR devices, based on the inherent magnitude, runtime, and integral constraints of demands. The DMM is evaluated on an IEEE 118 bus system, a high-fidelity simulation model of the midwestern U.S. power grid. The results show how the proposed mechanism can be utilized to determine combinations of DR devices in the presence of intermittent and uncertain renewables with varying levels of penetration so as to result in a desired level of social welfare.
A Dynamic Market Mechanism for the Integration of Renewables and Demand Response
Jesper Knudsen, Jacob Hansen, and Anuradha M. Annaswamy, Fellow, IEEE Abstract-The most formidable challenge in assembling a smart grid is the integration of a high penetration of renewables. Demand response (DR), a largely promising concept, is increasingly discussed as a means to cope with the intermittent and uncertain renewables. In this paper, we propose a dynamic market mechanism (DMM) that reaches the market equilibrium through continuous negotiations between key market players. In addition to incorporating renewables, this market mechanism also incorporates a quantitative taxonomy of DR devices, based on the inherent magnitude, runtime, and integral constraints of demands. The DMM is evaluated on an IEEE 118 bus system, a high-fidelity simulation model of the midwestern U.S. power grid. The results show how the proposed mechanism can be utilized to determine combinations of DR devices in the presence of intermittent and uncertain renewables with varying levels of penetration so as to result in a desired level of social welfare.
Index Terms-Demand response (DR), dynamic market mechanism (DMM), flexible consumption, integration of renewables, smart grid, wholesale energy market. Market-clearing period.
NOMENCLATURE

N
T d
Negotiation period. φ n Set of indices of bucket ConCos at node n. ϕ n Set of indices of battery ConCos at node n.
ψ n Set of indices of bakery ConCos at node n. θ n Set of indices of conventional GenCos at node n. ϑ n Set of indices of RER GenCos at node n. n Set of indices of nodes connected to node n.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE assembling of smart grid, a cyber-enabled transformation proposed for the current grid, faces a number of challenges, the most formidable of which is the integration of a high penetration of renewable energy resources (RERs). The typical operation of a power grid consists in achieving power balance where load is assumed to be fixed, and generation assets are assembled to equal the load, with voltage and frequency control achieved through inertial and terminal voltage stabilization of a large number of synchronous generators. The very first step in this operation, of power balance, is directly affected by the introduction of RERs due to the fact that power generation from RERs is subject to uncertainties and intermittencies.
One of the most promising concepts that is being increasingly discussed is demand response (DR), a concept that allows demand to be adjustable [1] - [3] , to cope with variations in RERs. A fairly vast literature exists on DR, its potential, and associated challenges and opportunities [4] - [6] . The concept of introducing flexible consumption in market operations has long been recognized as a highly beneficial one [7] , [8] . The idea is then to determine the procedure by which DR can be concomitantly used with RERs so as to ensure an optimal economic dispatch of generation for power balance.
The introduction of intermittency and uncertainty in a smart grid as well as the increasing potential of adjustable demand via DR necessitates a dynamic framework to address the operation, scheduling, and financial settlements in the dynamic and uncertain environment. The former brings in issues of strong intermittency and uncertainty, and the latter a feedback structure where demand can be modulated over a range of time scales. Both of these components are dictating a new look at market mechanisms, with a control viewpoint enabling a novel framework for analysis and synthesis. This paper proposes a dynamic market mechanism (DMM) together with a portfolio of DR devices to achieve an optimal economic dispatch in the presence of intermittencies and uncertainties in renewables.
Beginning with a framework that includes price as an underlying state, an attempt is made in this DMM to capture the dynamic interactions between generation, demand, locational marginal price (LMP), and congestion price. The solutions of this dynamic model can be viewed as negotiations between generating companies (GenCos), consumer companies (ConCos), and the independent system operator (ISO), which precede convergence to the market equilibrium. The DMM will also include a taxonomy of DR loads, denoted by buckets, batteries, and bakeries (BBB), whose classification is based on distinguishable characteristics of magnitude, runtime, and integral constraints. Conditions under which the DMM is stable and those under which the solutions converge to the market equilibrium are derived. The effect of introducing BBB for various levels of intermittency in RERs is explored. Also investigated is the robustness of the DMM to uncertainties in RERs.
The main idea behind the DMM is that a quantity akin to real-time price (RTP) is exchanged between DR-compatible consumers, generators including RERs, and ISO. The use of RTP for incentivizing DR-compatible consumers has been studied extensively (see [9] - [11] ). In these papers, the main benefit of RTP is claimed to be a maximum utilization of demand-side assets. As we will show in this paper, the proposed DMM ensures this utilization, with the underlying price quantity arrived at in a different and a stable manner.
The benefits of such a DMM over the more standard optimal power flow (OPF) solution, also shown in this paper, lie in the efficient integration of dynamic information about the RERs in terms of both intermittencies and uncertainties, as well as the flexible loads and their various constraints. The DMM presented here builds on [1] , [4] , and [12] . In [12] , a DMM was first proposed, but with all flexible demand assumed to be adjustable with no constraints. In [1] , shiftable DR loads were addressed as well, and in [4] , the scope was extended to include the BBB taxonomy analyzed in this paper. In [1] , [4] , and [12] , validation was limited to either an IEEE 4 bus or an IEEE 30 bus. Unlike these earlier papers, we carry out an extensive validation of an extended DMM in this paper using an IEEE 118 bus system that includes 54 generators, 99 consumers with a varied range of BBB loads, and 186 transmission lines.
The analysis and design of electricity markets have been addressed in [7] , [8] , and [11] - [17] . Alvarado et al. [13] provide a framework for a dynamic adjustment of the price, but do not take into account the market-clearing structure or constraints of capacity, congestion, or power balance. While [14] and [15] focus on the market design in the presence of energy storage and electric vehicles, DMMs that are simultaneously affected by flexible generation and consumption have not been explored in these works. Market volatility due to RTPs has been addressed in [16] and [17] . The focus of these investigations is on the sequence of equilibria arrived at using RTPs, where the consumers react to the price equilibrium rather than participate actively. Other papers such as [11] have focused on retail markets and the interactions between an energy provider such as a utility and noncooperative consumers.
The scope of discussions in this paper is at the wholesale level and is predicated on the assumption that ConCos exist that are DR compatible and can participate in the overall economic dispatch [8] , along with renewable generators. A DMM is proposed that prescribes continued negotiations between generators, consumers, and ISO, with active participation of all market entities in the creation of the cleared market price. Conditions under which the market equilibrium can be reached are derived.
While our focus here is on the wholesale market, all of the framework presented can be extended to the retail market under the assumptions of a unique market equilibrium [18] and reliable estimation of demand curves from end users. Our framework also presupposes that suitable aggregation of various types of demands is feasible (see [19] - [24] ), which are for the most part noncooperative [16] . This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present a brief introduction to electricity markets. In Section III, the wholesale energy market structure is introduced, which includes modeling of conventional generators, RER generators, BBB consumers, and our proposed DMM. In Section IV, numerical studies of an IEEE 118 bus system are reported to show the effects of the proposed dynamic model. Finally, in Sections V and VI, we provide discussions and concluding remarks, respectively.
II. INTRODUCTION TO ELECTRICITY MARKETS
An electricity market enables trade of electricity between suppliers and consumers. An efficient market is the one where electricity is traded at a price that minimizes the cost of generation while supplying the entire demand [25] . As electricity cannot be stored in large quantities at the current cost of energy storage, the amount of electricity generated must match the demand at every instant of time to ensure reliability. To ensure adequate amounts of generation also necessitates a forward planning of energy capacity. All of these lead to three broad classes of markets where electricity is traded, which include energy, forward capacity, and ancillary services [26] .
Energy markets accommodate trade of electricity considering it as an energy commodity. They also ensure just-in-time and just-in-place delivery of electricity to customers. Forward capacity markets are used to provide incentive for building new energy capacity to meet the future needs of consumers. Finally, ancillary service markets are used to provide all real-time services needed for reliable delivery of high-quality energy. These services include frequency regulation, voltage support, and spinning reserve capacity.
In all three classes of electricity markets, electricity suppliers participate by providing their offers based on their costs while consumers, if flexible, participate by providing their demand curves. While the exact procedures used in any given market are region dependent, trading in all of the above markets can be accomplished using bilateral, auction, and/or poolco financial contracts [27] . Bilateral transactions are agreements made between two parties, electricity supplier and electricity consumer, to exchange electricity under mutually agreeable terms for a specified period of time. Trading via auction and poolco contracts usually involves a third party, such as an ISO [28] , who oversees the transactions. In both cases, the trading agreement is arrived at by the ISO based on the best offers, but the distinction between them is that in a poolco market, neither ISO nor the participants know what the final price of the trading will be, while in an auction market, the price is public during bidding.
A third taxonomy of markets is on the basis of the type of participant in a market, and classified as wholesale and retail markets. Wholesale markets are run by ISO. Power GenCos that sell electricity to load serving entities typically participate in a wholesale market. Participants must bid in quantities of at least 1 MW. The retail electricity market manages the final stage of the power sale from electricity providers to end-use consumers such as small businesses and individual households. Wholesale can be either bilateral, auction, or pool, but retail markets are almost completely bilateral in the United States, with regulatory supervision (for example, Department of Public Utilities in the state of Massachusetts [29] ).
Regulation market is dedicated to providing frequency regulation in real time. While energy markets are primarily responsible for balancing demand and generation, any remaining imbalance is taken care of by the regulation market. These markets run once per hour and assign generators responsible for regulation in the next hour. Dispatch of these generators is done through automatic generation control, a fully automated centralized feedback control loop, at the rate of seconds. Forward reserve and real-time reserve markets are used to assign operating reserves throughout the day, which ensure reliable system operation under unpredicted circumstances, such as equipment failures and faults. We do not address regulation markets or retail markets in this paper.
Our focus of this paper is on wholesale energy markets where decision making occurs at a relatively faster time scale. Energy markets usually consist of decision levels at two different time scales, most important of which are a dayahead market (DAM) and a real-time market (RTM) [7] . The DAM is settled once every day with hourly schedules for the following day, with a certain market lead time. 1 These schedules specify the amounts of electricity to be produced, and consumed, each hour and at what price. Schedules are determined by the ISO to give the lowest price of electricity based on received generation bids and consumption predictions and bids. Any deviations from the DAM schedules are handled in the RTM. The RTM balances the differences from the DAM schedules when bids and predictions do not match the actual patterns. It runs on a time scale of minutes (with the marketclearing time anywhere between 5 and 15 min) and submitted before the start of each operating hour. A common tool used by the ISOs for decision making in the energy market is the OPF and is described in Section II-A.
As mentioned earlier, a typical energy market procedure consists of participation from electricity suppliers and consumers. The current practice, however, is the one where demand is essentially inflexible, whose profile varies with time but otherwise is not adjustable on demand. An active participation by consumers in electricity markets is an emerging one [31] . As of now, DR is integrated only in DAM 1 In ISO-NE, as of May 2013, bids are due by 10:00 A.M., and DAM LMPs, schedules, and constraints are published by 13:30 [30] .
(in a few states in the United States) at the wholesale level, but not in RTM.
A. Optimal Power Flow
The goal of the OPF method is to determine the schedule of generation over a certain period such that an underlying cost function is optimized [32] . This cost function, denoted by social welfare, represents the difference between the utility gained by the consumers and the cost incurred by the generators over the period of interest. The optimization of this cost function has to be carried out under both equality and inequality constraints. Equality constraints stem from power balance, as supply must equal demand at all points of the grid and at all times, and inequality constraints from capacity and ramp constraints in the generators and transmission lines. A simplified OPF procedure is described below.
A typical form of social welfare, denoted by S W , is given by
where x and y denote consumption and generation, respectively, U (·) denotes the utility function of consumers, and C(·) denotes the cost function of generators. Equality constraints of the form
have to be satisfied, which corresponds to power balance at every node in the grid, where z denotes external variables such as phase angles and c 1 is a constant. In addition, inequality constraints of the form
have to be simultaneously satisfied as well, where g i denote capacity and ramp constraints and c i are constants for i = 2, 3, 4. The OPF problem then corresponds to the maximization of S W given by max x∈X ,y∈Y
where X and Y denote the set of consumers and generators participating in the energy market. A preceding step to OPF, denoted by the unit commitment problem, is typically involved in the determination of the set Y. The OPF solution in an energy market then determines the optimal dispatch y of generation and x optimal consumption, given by the solution y = y and x = x of (4) subject to the equality constraint in (2) and inequality constraints in (3) . The difficulty in the above approach lies in the fact that this optimization is carried out T units ahead of the actual operation time when the generation and consumption occurs. This in turn implies that at this hour, accurate information about c i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, is assumed to be available. In DAM, in ISO-NE, for instance, the OPF solution that consists of the optimal generation schedules for an entire 24-h period starting at midnight are posted at 6:00 P.M. of the previous day [33] . That is, information about generation and consumption have to be accurately predicted T hours in advance, where 6 ≤ T ≤ 29. Such requirements become difficult to satisfy for several of the generation assets and near impossible for renewables. In an RTM, in ISO-NE, T = 30 min [33] . Even though this shorter lead time makes the deployment of renewables more effective, a further reduction in this lead time can be beneficial.
In contrast to such an OPF procedure, the DMM that we propose in this paper is an iterative approach that allows closer to real-time negotiations between generators, consumers, and the ISO, thereby allowing more accurate information that becomes available over the period T to be incorporated. In addition, we include a large class of consumers that are DR compatible. The role of consumers x in OPF has been, by and large, represented by utilities participating at the wholesale level. That is, utilities would participate in the OPF by providing the predicted demand x inflexible to the price, i.e., U (x) = const. With emergence of DR programs, the set X is expanding, to include large (typically industrial) customers that would respond to the time of use prices or to improve reliability according to the needs of the ISO [34] . With more frequent and uncertain variations in generation, such methods often become inadequate. A systematic and widespread inclusion of demand in market dispatch is becoming increasingly attractive. The nature of demand, however, varies significantly. While many of them are flexible, they are subject to various static and dynamic constraints [4] . Some types of power consumption may be directly adjustable, with the overall upper and lower limits in magnitude, but others may have energy constraints, with varying specifications on runtime. To successfully integrate DR-compatible consumers responding to prices, these varying characteristics (ramping rates, consumption limitations, etc.) have to be considered. Toward this end, the DMM that we propose in this paper assumes that consumers are DR compatible and classifies them on the basis of the type of underlying constraint in their consumption. This DMM is an overall iterative approach that allows generators and consumers to respond to suggested prices from the ISO while accommodating all relevant constraints, and can be shown to converge to an efficient market equilibrium. This is discussed in more detail in Section III.
III. DYNAMIC MARKET MECHANISM
We propose a DMM in this paper for carrying out economic dispatch in a wholesale electricity market. The main participants in this market can be classified into three: 1) ConCo; 2) GenCo; and 3) ISO. The procedure by which this market mechanism functions is through an iterative set of negotiations, where both ConCos and GenCos submit their suggested bids, which are schedules of consumption and generation, respectively, to which then the ISO responds with suggested prices. The negotiations continue until the market equilibrium is reached. All GenCos are assumed to bid their marginal cost, i.e., not exercise strategic bidding such as arbitrage. For RER GenCos, this further implies that they are competitive [35] and bid to the best of their knowledge, i.e., always treating the conditioning forecast as truth. Section III-A presents models of the consumers, who are assumed to be DR compatible. Here, we present the details of the BBB loads. Section III-B presents generators that include both conventional and RER GenCos. The latter are assumed to have improved forecasts with decreasing prediction horizon. Section III-C addresses the market-clearing procedure, and Section III-D includes the details of the market negotiations of the DMM. The stability of the DMM is addressed in Section III-E.
A. Consumer Modeling
The ConCos are modeled based on a flexibility taxonomy denoted by BBB and separate consumers into three classes based on magnitude, runtime, and integral constraints as described below [4] .
1) Buckets:
A consumption unit i is defined to be a bucket if it is a power-and energy-constrained integrator, a typical example of which are energy storage units such as air conditioner units and refrigeration systems. Each bucket i ∈ D c = {1, 2, . . . , N Dc } is assumed to consist of one consuming unit, with its consumption denoted by P Dc i (t). The associated utility of consumption is assumed quadratic, yielding linearly decreasing marginal utility, as follows:
where b Dc i and c Dc i are the consumption base and incremental utility, respectively. The power and energy constraints of bucket i are formally stated in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Bucket):
The demand P Dc i (t) is defined to be of a bucket if P Dc i (t) and the stored energy E Dc i (t) satisfy the following constraints:
where t = 0, 1, . . . , ∞, and P Dc i and P Dc i and E Dc i and E Dc i are the prespecified lower and upper bounds on the power P Dc i and energy E Dc i , respectively. A possible behavior of a bucket ConCo is shown in Fig. 1 .
2) Batteries: A consumption unit i is defined to be a battery if it is, similar to a bucket, a power-and energy-constrained integrator but with an additional constraint of a deadline for achieving a fully charged state. Examples of batteries are PHEV and swimming pool circulations and filtering systems. Each battery i ∈ D t = {1, 2, . . . , N Dt } is assumed to consist of one consuming unit, with its consumption denoted by P Dt i (t). The associated utility of consumption is assumed quadratic, yielding linearly decreasing marginal utility, as follows:
where b Dt i and c Dt i are the consumption base and incremental utility, respectively. The power and energy constraints of battery i are formally stated in the following definition.
Definition 2 (Battery):
The demand P Dt i (t) is defined to be of a battery if P Dt i (t) and the stored energy E Dt i (t) satisfy the following constraints:
. . , ∞, P Dt i and E Dt i are the prespecified upper bounds on the power P Dt i and energy E Dt i , respectively, and T i,end ∈ N + . A possible behavior of a battery ConCo is shown in Fig. 2. 3) Bakeries: A consumption unit i is defined to be a bakery if in addition to having constraints on the power, energy, and runtime, the unit is constrained to acquire the energy in a single uninterrupted stretch of constant consumption. Any batch process with a predetermined production cycle such as large industrial production facilities and bakeries falls under this category. Each bakery i ∈ D k = {1, 2, . . . , N Dk } is assumed to consist of one consuming unit, with its consumption denoted by P Dk i (t). The power and energy constraints of bakery i are formally stated in the following definition.
Definition 3 (Bakery): The demand P Dk i (t) is defined to be of a bakery if P Dk i (t) and the stored energy E Dk i (t) satisfy the following constraints:
(9e) where t = 0, 1, . . . , ∞, P Dk i and E Dk i are the prespecified upper bounds on the power P Dk i and energy
, and v i (t) ∈ {0, 1} is the binary ON/OFF state of bakery i . For the purposes of this paper, the sequence v i (t) is assumed fixed across all bakeries. A possible behavior of a bakery ConCo is shown in Fig. 3 . 
B. Generator Modeling
The GenCos are separated into conventional units (e.g., coal and nuclear plants) and RER units (e.g., wind and solar plants) and separately modeled as follows.
1) Conventional GenCos: For each conventional GenCo i ∈ G c = {1, 2, . . . , N Gc } assumed to consist of one generating unit, the generation bid is denoted by P Gc i (t). The associated operation cost as given in (10) is assumed quadratic, yielding linearly increasing marginal cost
where b Gc i and c Gc i are the generation base and incremental cost, respectively. The power P Gc i (t) is subject to two constraints given by
where (11a) is a power constraint and (11b) is a rate constraint, which when combined enforce minimum and maximum values of P Gc i (t) according to the generating units' properties and prior state. Startup and shutdown costs are not included in this model.
2) RER GenCos:
For each RER GenCo i ∈ G r = {1, 2, . . . , N Gr } assumed to consist of one generating unit, the generation bid is denoted by P Gr i (t). The estimated operation cost as given in (12) is assumed quadratic, yielding linearly increasing marginal cost
where b Gr i and c Gr i are the generation base and incremental cost, respectively. RER GenCos, in general, have low base cost and negligible incremental costs compared with conventional ones. The bid P Gr i (t) is subject to two constraints given by
where (13a) is a power constraint and (13b) is a rate constraint, which when combined enforce minimum and maximum values of P Gr i (t) according to the generating units' properties and prior state. Denoting the true unknown maximum generation limit by P Gr i , we note that P Gr i may not be known as it is subject to external conditions, e.g., wind speeds in the case of a wind farm. Since P Gr i may not be known during the bidding process, we assume that it is estimated using forecast models as P Gr i (t) and satisfies inequality (13a). That is, assuming that the deviation between this estimate and the true value can be represented as where Gr i (t) ≥ −1 ensures that as the prediction horizon T H decreases, the estimate P Gr i (T H ) approaches its true value P Gr i (see Fig. 4 ). The recent results show that the accuracy of forecast models improves with decreasing prediction horizon [36] , where a Gr i of 10% can be realized for a prediction horizon of 4 min, i.e., T H = 4 min with
The DMM that we propose to use can take advantage of such forecast models by having its negotiations use improved estimates as time proceeds. This is discussed in more detail in Section IV.
The inequality −1 ≤ Gr i (t) < 0 represents underestimation, i.e., the RER GenCo assumes a maximum generation limit that is smaller than the true limit and the GenCo is assumed to waste a portion of their capacity due to the forecasting error. The inequality Gr i (t) > 0 represents overestimation, i.e., the RER GenCo assumes a maximum generation limit that is higher than the true limit causing lack of power. The GenCo is then penalized for the shortfall by the ISO with the cost of acquiring the missing power from an expensive unit in the reserve market (see [37] ). The rate constraint is, as observed in (13b), using the actual prior power level and not an estimate since the prior state is known even for an RER generating unit. Startup and shutdown costs are not included in this model, and the reserve market is assumed to be always at one's disposal and cleared elsewhere.
C. Market Clearing
The market clearing is managed by the ISO, optimizing a cost function subject to system constraints [1] . In addition to the constraints introduced in Sections III-A and III-B, the system constraints include network losses and line capacity limitations. The power flow through lines is constrained by physical parameters, and lines are said to be congested when the power flow approaches these constraints. Congestion is directly included in this model, whereas ohmic losses are excluded. The cost function, commonly termed social welfare, is designed such that the ISO acts on behalf of ConCos and GenCos, maximizing the utility of ConCos and minimizing the cost of GenCos. As detailed in Section III-B, our model allows power imbalances due to forecasting errors during negotiation, implying that the true cost of generation is found in postprocessing. To accommodate this, we denote the intermediate social welfare used as cost function in market clearing by S W and the true postprocessed social welfare by S W , with the former given by
where z(k) denotes the value of a variable z at time t = t k , with t k+1 = t k + T m , and T m denotes the market-clearing period. The market-clearing optimization problem is then given by min −S W (16) subject to i∈φ n
where δ n (k) denotes the voltage angle at node n, B nm and P nm denotes the susceptance and the maximum capacity of the line from node n to node m, respectively, and E ref
(k) denotes the minimum reference to guarantee that battery ConCo i satisfies (8d) as specified later. Constraint (17a) enforces nodal power balance, (17b) enforces line capacity limits, (17c)-(17f) enforce power consumption and generation limits for buckets and batteries, (17g) and (17h) enforce generation rate limits, and finally (17i) and (17j) enforce consumption energy limits for buckets and batteries, respectively. It should be noted that P Gr i (k − 1) in (17h) is the actual value rather than its estimate as these constraints are being evaluated using k − 1. As the true values of the renewable generation are not known at k, their estimates are used in (17h)
where T i,start = T i,end − E Dt i /P Dt i . This reference guarantees battery ConCo i to satisfy (8d) while respecting the power limit (8b), and is exemplified in Fig. 5 . The choice of E ref (18) implies that battery i has the ability to hold out on consumption until the price is favorable, but holding out for too long forces consumption at any cost when k approaches T i,end . We
D. Market Negotiations of the DMM
We now address the underlying optimization problem that is the optimization of (16) subject to the equality constraint in (17a) and the inequality constraints in (17b)-(17j), at each market-clearing instant k. This is of the form
where f (x), g i (x), and h j (x) are differentiable functions. Formulating the associated Lagrangian as
where λ i and μ j are the Lagrangian multipliers, Theorem 1 establishes the optimum vector set (x * , λ * , μ * ), which can be found by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions [38] , [39] . The existence of (x * , λ * , μ * ) implies zero duality gap [39] , i.e., Slater's condition is satisfied.
Theorem 1 (Saddle-Point Theorem): x * is a unique solution to (19a) if and only if (x
The solution (x * , λ * , μ * ) can be found using an iterative solution such as the primal-dual interior-point method [39] given by
where α x , α λ , and α μ are positive scalars controlling the amount of change in the gradient direction and Proj μ (·) is a projection operator that ensures nonnegativity of μ j , using bounds μ and μ and a boundary-layer thickness [see (24) for details]. The application of this method to the optimization problem corresponding to (16) and (17) forms the DMM. The starting point for the proposed DMM is the construction of a Lagrangian L, similar to (20) as
where P Gc i , P Gr i , P Dc i , P Dt i , P Dk i , and δ n correspond to the states x in (19), ρ n and γ nm are the Lagrange multipliers and correspond to the LMP at node n and the congestion prices of the line from node n to node m, respectively, and C G (P G ) and U D P D are given by
Finally, the projection operator is given by
where is a small positive number, y = [y 1 . . . In order to arrive at a solution to (22) , which is the overall market equilibrium, we propose an adjustment of the states x in (22), at instances t K , K = 0, 1, 2, . . ., as in (21), as given in (25) , as shown at the bottom of this page. It is useful to note that the number of states at each node n is given by the cardinality of ConCo sets φ n , ϕ n , and ψ n , GenCo sets θ n and ϑ n , one for the node voltage angle δ n , and one for the node LMP ρ n . The time scale of these adjustments is assumed to be much faster than the market-clearing time, i.e., if we define t K +1 = t K + T d , the negotiation period T d is assumed to be much smaller than T m (see Fig. 6 ). In (25) , the conventional generators and renewable generators individually negotiate as P Gc i and P Gr i , respectively, and α x denotes the step sizes corresponding to variable x.
The goal of the DMM is therefore to start from any t k and for the state
, and γ nm (t k ) to converge to the equilibrium P *
n , ρ * n , and γ * nm as the next market-clearing time approaches. That is, we are interested in convergence to the equilibrium as K increases, that is, as
Denoting individual elements of a vector z by z i , the DMM in (25) can be written in state-space form as
where
where δ is the N − 1 × 1 voltage angle vector, ρ is the N × 1 LMP vector, P Dc is the N Dc ×1 bucket consumer vector, P Dt is the N Dt ×1 battery consumer vector, P Dk is the N Dk ×1 bakery consumer vector, P Gc is the N Gc × 1 conventional generator vector, P Gr is the N Gr × 1 RER generator vector, and γ is the N t × 1 congestion price vector corresponding to the N t unique δ n − δ m equations. Furthermore, A denotes the N t × N bus incidence matrix and A r denotes the N t × N − 1 reduced bus incidence matrix with the column of A corresponding to the reference bus removed. A Dc , A Dt , and A Dk denote the N × N Dc , N × N Dt , and N × N Dk , respectively, consumer incidence matrices, where entry i j = 1 if the j th consumer is connected to the i th bus and entry i j = 0 if the j th consumer is not connected to the i th bus. Similarly, A Gc denotes the N × N Gc conventional generator incidence matrix and A Gr denotes the N × N Gr RER generator incidence matrix. B line denotes the N t × N t diagonal line admittance matrix, c's denote the diagonal matrices of incremental coefficients,
and b's denote the vectors of base coefficients. P's, E's and R's denote the vectors of maximum power, energy, and rate, respectively. P's, E's, and R's denote the vectors of minimum power, energy, and rate, respectively. P nm is the vector of maximum line capacity limits, and d γ denotes the vector of maximum bounds on γ. Finally, is a small positive number and α's are the diagonal matrices of appropriate gradient step sizes.
The equilibrium set of the wholesale electricity market given by the game in (25) is defined as
is an equilibrium point if and only if (x * 1 , x * 2 ) ∈ E. For a sufficiently large K , it follows that if (26) is stable, then the solutions of (27a) and (27b) will be arbitrarily close to the equilibrium.
E. Stability of the DMM
The stability properties of the DMM are addressed in this section. We assume strong duality, i.e., zero duality gap, and that the equilibrium (x * 1 , x * 2 ) ∈ E exists. In the following, we require A 1 in (26) to be Schur stable. It is easy to show that a sufficient condition for Schur stability of A 1 is that at least one of the projected states P Gc i , P Gr i , P Dc i , and P Dt i needs to be nonprojected, i.e., must not have reached its projection bounds. By contradiction, we will argue that this is a reasonable requirement as the opposite would pose a system with no flexibility left with either generators or consumers. We assume one of the generators not to hit its projection limits resulting in A 1 given by
where A Gc is the column of A Gc corresponding to the generator that is not projected, c Gc is the incremental cost of that generator, and α Gc is the associated time step of that generator. Using appropriate values for α δ , α ρ , and α Gc , A 1 is Schur stable. We now introduce a few definitions. Let P be the symmetric solution of 
Gc , y 24 = P Gr − P * Gr , y 25 = γ − γ * , and
T , and define 
Theorem 2: Let strong duality hold. Then, the equilibrium (26) is stable for all the initial conditions in max if A 1 is Schur stable. In addition, all trajectories will converge to min .
Proof: The following lemma is useful.
. It is easily observed that (24) ensures thatV will gradually approach zero when y approaches d y or d y .
The rate change of the positive definite Lyapunov function
From this point on, we will suppress the explicit time dependence of time-varying parameters and we get 
Since A 1 is Schur stable, the right-hand side of (36) can be rewritten using the definitions of β 1 -β 20 along with the projection bounds on y 2 as follows:
Using definitions for η 1 and η 2 , we obtain From (38) , the boundedness of y1 and convergence of all trajectories to min follow min . Furthermore, it is apparent that min is a subset of max , since y 1 is arbitrary in max and specified by η in min .
IV. CASE STUDIES
We now illustrate the features of the DMM using a case study. We will show that our DMM is capable of identifying the combination of DR units that will be needed, as the RERs vary. Variations in the overall penetration level will be considered, as well as in the intermittency of a given RER. Also considered are uncertainties in the RER. It will be shown that in all the cases, the DMM will identify the combination of BBB that is necessary to achieve optimal economic dispatch.
The case studies reported below use a modified IEEE 118 bus system, 2 a high-fidelity simulation of the midwestern U.S. power grid as of December 1962. The modified bus system consists of 54 generators, 99 consumers, and 186 transmission lines connected as shown in Fig. 7 . The modified IEEE 118 bus diagram uses the following syntax: each generator is associated with two numbers in red. The left one indicates the class of generator, either conventional or RER. The right number indicates the type of that generator. Each consumer is also associated with two numbers in red. The left one indicates the class of consumer, either a bucket, a battery, or a bakery. The right number indicates the type of the consumption unit, based on its power and energy rating. 2 Unmodified bus data: http://ee.washington.edu/research/pstca/ Fig. 8 . Example of the syntax of the modified IEEE 118 bus diagram. 10 is the bus number, 1 is the class of the generator, 2 is the type of the generator, 3 is the class of the consumer, and 4 is the type of the consumer.
Conventional and RER generators are numbered 1 and 2, respectively, while buckets, batteries, and bakeries are numbered 1, 2, and 3, respectively. An example is given in Fig. 8 . Definitions of the types for both generators and consumers can be found in the Appendix. The modified IEEE 118 bus system shown in Fig. 7 is made up of 45 conventional generators (13 of type 1, 12 of type 2, and 20 of type 3), 9 RER generators (all of type 1), 0 bucket consumers, 0 battery consumers, and 99 bakery consumers (33 of type 1, 33 of type 2, and 33 of type 3). Any alterations from this setup will be specified in the corresponding cases.
The three categories of BBB consumption units are introduced into the 118 bus system in the following manner. The locations of bakeries, 99 in number, are assumed to be fixed, as indicated in the IEEE 118 bus system shown in Fig. 7 . This is denoted by a B distribution. These 99 bakeries were chosen to be one of the three types defined in Table XI of the Appendix with the type distribution chosen in a uniform manner. To this distribution, 30 batteries are introduced at locations as shown in Table I . This is denoted by a BB distribution. Finally, ten buckets as defined in Table II are TABLE I  ADDITIONS OF BATTERY CONSUMERS TO THE MODIFIED   118 BUS SYSTEM FOR CASES I1 TO I3   TABLE II  ADDITIONS OF BUCKET CONSUMERS TO THE MODIFIED   118 BUS SYSTEM FOR CASES I1 TO I3   TABLE III introduced at various locations. The choices of the locations of the bakeries in Fig. 7 , batteries in Table I , and buckets in Table II were fairly arbitrary. The choices of the distribution of the 30 batteries across the three types described in Table X of the Appendix were uniform. When introducing battery consumption, we replace the equivalent amount of bakery consumption from the system by removing the bakery at a node where we add a battery. This is done to keep the overall consumption at the same level. However, while introducing bucket consumption, we simply add bucket consumers as their flexibility do not compare with the consumption of bakery or battery consumers. It should be noted that the number of buckets, batteries, and bakeries was chosen arbitrarily. A second level of optimization of these numbers may be feasible, but is not addressed in this paper.
The different cases considered in this paper are grouped so as to illustrate the behavior of the proposed DMM in the presence of: 1) uncertainties in RERs and 2) intermittencies in RERs. All the cases are assumed to correspond to the wholesale RTM, with a market-clearing time of 5 min and evaluated over a 1-h period.
First, the impact of uncertainty in RER generation availability is studied by varying the forecasting errors included in the model by Gr i in (14) . Second, the impact of intermittencies in RER generation availability is studied over a range of RER penetration levels and over a range of intermittency of the RER generators. The intermittency in RER is implemented as shown in Fig. 9 , where over a 5-min period in the entire hour, it is assumed that the maximum power available can take any one of the three different values. This reflects variations due to extreme weather conditions [40] . The baseline corresponds to the red solid line where there are no intermittencies. The red dashed line poses a drop in RER generation availability of 30%, the blue dashed line poses a drop of 60%, and the orange dashed line poses a drop of 90%. In each case, it is assumed that DR consumers from BBB introduced in Section III-A are available.
Three levels of RER penetration of 15%, 30%, and 45% are introduced. When increasing the RER penetration level, we replace the capacity of conventional generators with RER generators, but keep the overall generation capacity equal across all the configurations. Each of these penetration levels is assumed to be realized in the 118 bus system in the following manner. A 15% penetration level is realized by choosing the generators, both conventional and RER, as shown in Fig. 7 . RER penetration levels of 30% and 45% are realized by modifying the generators as described in Tables III and IV, respectively. For each of these penetration levels, we introduce three levels of intermittencies. The intermittency profiles are, as described earlier, shown in Fig. 9 .
The DMM proposed in (26) and (27a) is now applied to the modified IEEE 118 bus. The initial values for all α constants are set at 0.001, and all the state variables are set at arbitrary values within the bound of the specific variable. If the variable is unbounded, the initial condition is set at zero. It was observed that in all the cases, the DMM converged to the market equilibrium if it exists. The cases where the equilibrium did not exist are denoted as being infeasible. Before proceeding with the analysis of the DMM in the presence of uncertainties and intermittencies in the RER, we first present the results at one operating condition below.
The steady-state values of P Gc i , P Gr i , P Dk i , P Dt i , E Dt i , P Dc i , and E Dc i are shown in Figs. 10 and 11 . In Figs. 10 and 11 , the results correspond to a total of 60 min, with 12 market clearings in total, one occurring every 5 min. The generation mix, bakery power, battery power, battery energy, bucket power, and bucket energy needed to achieve market clearing at each of the 12 instants are shown in Tables VI-VIII. The same information is provided as a snap shot in a 3-D format in Fig. 11 including the accumulated power levels of all the 11 assets in the system throughout all the 12 market-clearing instances. The 11 assets include RER generation type 1, conventional generation type 1, conventional generation type 2, conventional generation type 3, bakery consumption type 1, bakery consumption type 2, bakery consumption type 3, battery consumption type 1, battery consumption type 2, battery consumption type 3, and bucket consumption type 1. All the results shown in Figs. 10 and 11 correspond to a 15% RER penetration level, a 90% RER drop between the 30-min and the 35-min window, and a BBB configuration.
In Fig. 10(a) , we observe the output of each of the 54 generators for each market clearing. The generators are colored according to class and type; green is RER generation, red is conventional generation type 1, magenta is conventional generation type 2, and blue is conventional generation type 3 (see the Appendix for the classification of types). Shades within each color distinguish individual generators.
In Fig. 10(b) , we observe the bakery consumption of each of the 69 bakery consumers included in the 118 bus system. The consumption is once again colored according to the type; red is bakery consumption type 1, green is bakery consumption type 2, and blue is bakery consumption type 3 (see the Appendix for the classification of types). Shades within each color distinguish individual consumption units. Similarly, in Fig. 10(c) and (d), we observe power consumption of each of the 30 battery consumers and energy consumption of these consumers, respectively. The color red is battery consumption type 1, green is battery consumption type 2, and blue is battery consumption type 3.
In Fig. 10 (e) and (f), the bucket power and energy consumptions of each of the ten buckets are shown, respectively, which are all of the same type.
Figs. 10 and 11 show how the flexible consumption with the BBB configuration follows the low-cost RER generation when available. In particular, at the seventh market-clearing instance (at the 30th min), where the RER generation availability drops as given by the orange dashed curve on Fig. 9, Figs. 10 and 11 show how the flexible consumers aid in balancing the system. The battery consumers turn OFF, while the bucket consumers act as generators to maintain the power balance with limited ramping of conventional generators. As higher RER generation becomes available in the subsequent market clearings, the battery consumers turn back ON to ensure reaching the individual maximum energy level within the deadline.
A. Uncertainty Impacts
As mentioned in Section III-B, RER generation negotiations include an uncertainty Gr i as in (14) . It was argued in Section III-B that this uncertainty reduces to zero with the prediction horizon T H , as demonstrated in Fig. 4 . In other words, between any two market-clearing instants t k and t k+1 , as negotiations proceed, the magnitude of Gr i (t) reduces. In contrast, in an OPF, the estimate P Gr i (t) is set to
with the value of Gr i (k) set at a constant value corresponding to the forecast error prevalent at t k over the whole interval [k, k + 1]. In Case Studies U1 and U2, we compare the DMM and OPF for different types of uncertainties. The IEEE 118 bus system as in Fig. 7 is used with the maximum power limit of the RER generators following the red solid line in Fig. 9 .
1) Case Study U1:
We compared the performances of the DMM and OPF for the case when the forecast error was 5% when the negotiations began, and reduced to 1% 1 min prior to the market-clearing time, that is, Gr i (t k ) = 0.05 and
.01, where T * H = 1 min. The positive forecasting error represents overestimation, leading to a lack of power which is assumed to be acquired in the reserve market. Based on the historical reserve cost from PJM 3 the cost of the reserve market is set at ten times the cost of the most expensive generator. The comparison of the DMM and OPF is carried out using social welfare. The results obtained are shown in Table V , which illustrates that DMM results in a 17.1% increase compared with the OPF.
2) Case Study U2: Similar to Case Study U1, another comparison of the DMM and OPF is for the case when Gr i (K ) = −5% when the negotiations begin and decreases to −1% over a 4-min period, i.e., T H = 4 min. The negative forecasting error represents underestimation, leading to a waste of RER generation capacity and unnecessary high amount of power being generated from conventional generators. The results obtained are shown in Table V , which illustrates that DMM results in a 9.5% increase compared with the OPF. The change in Case Study U1 is greater than in Case Study U2 as acquiring power in the reserve market imposes a larger additional cost than a dispatch with more power coming from conventional generators.
B. Intermittency Impacts
In this section, we explore the performance of the DMM in the presence of intermittencies in the RER.
1) Case Study I1:
Here, we assume that there is a 30% drop in the available RER from the 30th to the 35th min, over a 1-h period of study (corresponding to the red dashed line in Fig. 9 ). We evaluate the behavior of the DMM with RER penetration levels at 15%, 30%, and 45%. The resulting performance of the DMM is summarized in Table VI. The entries in Table VI correspond to the improvement in S W compared with that in a nominal case, which corresponds to S W obtained at a 15% RER penetration level, with the only consumption units corresponding to bakeries, and a 30% drop in RER level, i.e., the (1, 3) entry in Table VI. Table VI shows the three kinds of BBB distributions that are needed in order to accommodate the varying levels of RER penetration (B denotes the use of bakeries only, BB denotes bakeries and batteries, and BBB denotes the use of all three consumption units bakeries, batteries, and buckets). Each of the nine entries was a result of the DMM solution. Entry (1, 2) did not result in a feasible solution.
2) Case Study I2: Here, we assume that there is a 60% drop in the available RER over the same period as in Case Study I1 (corresponding to the blue dashed line in Fig. 9 ). We once again evaluate the behavior of the DMM at the three RER penetration levels as in Case Study I1. The resulting performance of the DMM is summarized in Table VII . The same nominal case as in Case Study I1 was used in order to compute the entries of Table VII. The higher magnitude of the drop can be seen to result in making the use of bakeries alone entirely infeasible, i.e., all the entries in the first column of Table VII did not result in a feasible solution. It should be noted that the increase in the social welfare with the introduction of batteries and buckets is somewhat inflated, as the utility costs of bakeries are not included in the definition of S W .
3 http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/data-dictionary.aspx 3) Case Study I3: Here, we assume that there is a 90% drop in the available RER over the same period as in Case Study I1 (corresponding to the orange dashed line in Fig. 9 ) and evaluate the DMM for the same RER penetration levels as in Case Studies I1 and I2. The resulting performance of the DMM is summarized in Table VIII. More combinations can be  observed to be infeasible, compared with Tables VI and VIII , which is to be expected.
C. Observations
The following are some important observations to be made from Tables VI-VIII. 1) Tables VI-VIII show that S W increases as the RER drops. 2) Across Tables VI-VIII, we observe smaller improvements in social welfare when the drop in RER generation availability increases. This is logical as increased drops imply less low-cost RER generation in the system. 3) Tables VI and VII show that the BB configuration results in increased improvements in S W even as the RER penetration level raises. This is primarily due to the injection of more low-cost RER generation capacity in the system, i.e., reduced reliance on higher cost conventional generator. 4) A row-wise comparison of Tables VI and VII for BB and BBB configurations shows improvements across the board with the addition of buckets. The exact relative improvements highly depend on the constraint in each scenario. 5) Across Tables VI-VIII, we observe more scenarios becoming infeasible as the drop in RER generation availability increases. In the case of 90% drop, for instance, only 15% RER penetration is feasible if no buckets are available. 6) Table VI shows that if only bakeries were to be used, a 30% RER penetration level becomes infeasible. This underscores two obvious points, which are that relying on RER generation is possible if the corresponding drop is not too large for them to still cover any inflexible consumption and that the model can capture properties of the grid, such as inflexibility due to ramping limits. In general, it should be noted that the number of iterations needed to reach equilibrium is rather large as the DMM discussed here uses a gradient-based scheme. However, the following points should be noted.
1) The number of iterations needed to reach equilibrium does not increase with node size (see [41] ). 2) Faster recursive schemes compared with (25a)-(25g) have been shown in [42] to result in much fewer iterations enabling convergence in 30 s in an IEEE 118 bus.
V. COMPARISON WITH ALTERNATE APPROACHES
We now provide a brief discussion on the proposed model in comparison with an alternative proposal.
The DMM approach implements, and relies on, LMP that is arrived at by taking full advantage of the flexibility provided on the demand side. The argument behind the use of the LMP is that it leads to nodal power balance, i.e., it denotes the price that makes generation and consumption match. Instead of using LMP, one could have used any price-driven incentive signal, and this signal need not be the true price but merely be any price-driven incentive signal for the generators and consumers to react on. One such example is critical peak pricing (CPP). In a system with CPP, the price is manually raised to encourage lower consumption during critical scenarios. For example, in the scenarios addressed in Cases I1, I2, and I3 the price could be raised for the duration of the weather situation. If done intelligently, the positives of a CPP approach are the overall lowered risk of system instability as consumption reduces and the dependency on intermittent and uncertain generation reduces. However, CPP is an open-loop control approach and as such cannot be guaranteed to reduce consumption by the needed amount. In a system with flexible consumers such as the BBB, a CPP approach must be carefully designed such that the peak price utilizes the flexibility of bucket and battery consumers correctly, i.e., the price must be such that batteries turn OFF just the right amount and buckets act as generators at just the right time. In contrast, with the DMM approach and the use of LMP arrived at through iterative negotiations, the prices and the time instants can be automatically determined through closed-loop actions and utilize all flexibilities available.
In [43] , a wide variety of pricing strategies are discussed thoroughly and the advantages and disadvantages of each are presented. RTP comes out of this discussion as the pricing strategies with the highest potential, but as pointed out in [17] , adoption of RTP comes with a risk of adding instability to a system, which has to be dealt with carefully. The results of this paper, and the stability conditions articulated in Theorem 1, can be viewed as a guideline for pricing strategies that avoid such instabilities.
VI. CONCLUSION In this paper, we have proposed a DMM for wholesale electricity markets with different classes of flexible DR-compatible units, renewable generators, and an ISO that determines the economic dispatch. Conditions under which this DMM is stable and the region of attaction are delineated, and its performance is validated using an IEEE 118 bus, a high-fidelity simulation of the the midwestern U.S. Power Grid. The defining feature of the DMM, namely, the negotiation process between all market players, is shown to result in increased social welfare, when compared with the standard OPF tool, in the presence of uncertainties in RER generators. The DMM not only demonstrates the flexibility of the different classes of consumption units, buckets, batteries, and bakeries, which help mitigate the negative impacts from intermittent RER generators, but also determines the desired combination of BBB as the levels of intermittency and penetration increase and the corresponding increases in social welfare. While all the results derived are applicable to the wholesale electricity market, which is pool based and ISO centric, the fundamental principles of DMM have the potential to be applied to bilateral as well as retail markets that need to be increasingly engaged as more analytics and decision making enter the distribution and demand-side entities in the electricity grid.
APPENDIX CONSUMER AND GENERATOR CONSTANTS
This section provides the consumer and generator constants used for the case studies described in Section IV. Tables IX-XI provide bucket, battery, and bakery consumer constants, respectively. Table XII provide conventional and RER generator constants.
